The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law by Manzanetti, Anthony B.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 4 Article 15
1-1-1984
The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the
Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law
Anthony B. Manzanetti
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony B. Manzanetti, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 Pac. L. J. 1291 (1984).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/15
The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation
on the Public Trust Doctrine
in Water Law
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for
the change.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
In the summer of 1983 the California Supreme Court held, in Na-
tional Audubon Society v. Superior Court,' that the public trust doc-
trine preserves the continuing sovereign power of the state to protect
uses for water deemed to be in the public interest.3 The power of
the state to protect these "public trust uses" bars any party from
claiming vested water rights that harm the public trust.' This imposes
a perpetual duty on the state to take public trust uses into considera-
tion in allocating water resources.'
The public trust doctrine as formulated in National Audubon Society
allows the state to reconsider allocation decisions that permit harm
to come to the res of the trust, even though the initial allocation
decisions were made after due consideration of their effect on the
public trust. 6 If the state finds that vested water rights7 harm the public
trust, the state may reconsider those rights to accommodate the chang-
ing public needs.8 This power to reconsider vested water rights is a
new facet to the public trust doctrine. 9
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
2. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, modified, 33 Cal. 3d 726a, cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 413 (1983).
3. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
4. Id. at 425-26, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
5. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
6. See id.
7. "No vested rights bar such reconsideration." Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 365.
8. Id.
9. See generally, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE PUBLIC TRUST DocaINE IN NATURAL
RESOURCE LAw AND MANAGEMENT (H. Dunning, ed. 1981); Eikel & Williams, The Public Trust
Doctrine and the California Coastline, 6 URB. LAW. 519 (1974); Littman, Tidelands: Trusts,
Easements, Custom and Implied Dedication, 10 NAT. REsouRcEs LAW. 279 (1977); Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICi. L.
REV. 473 (1970); Comment, Public Access and the California Coastal Commission; A Question
of Overreaching, 21 SANTA CtARA L. Ray. 395 (1981); Comment, California's Tideland Trust
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The National Audubon Society decision is merely advisory because
no vested rights to use water have been affected directly. The deci-
sion only resolves the legal conundrum ' ° of two competing systems
of thought that seemingly suggest opposite results-the public trust
doctrine and the doctrine of prior appropriation of water." Lawsuits
have been filed invoking the public trust doctrine of National Audubon
Society as a basis for reducing the existing supply of water available
for use.' 2 If a vested water right is reduced or extinguished because
of incompatibility with public trust uses, the question arises whether
the fifth amendment' 3 to the United States Constitution protects the
water rights holder by entitling him to compensation for the loss. The
California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society suggested that
it would reject a claim that these reductions constitute takings for
which compensation is required. "We do not divest anyone of title
to property: the consequence of our decision will be only that some
land owners . . . will . . . hold [their property] subject to the public
trust."" This circumvention of the fifth amendment command to com-
pensate is the central theme of this comment.
Using the National Audubon Society controversy as a building block,
a Model Scenario will be constructed. This Model Scenario will be
used to probe the consequences of the public trust doctrine as defined
in National Audubon Society. The Model Scenario will test the power
of the state to reconsider allocation decisions in spite of vested water
rights against the standards of the fifth amendment.'" The analysis
for Modifiable Public Purposes, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 485 (1973); Note, California's Tideland
Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HASTNGS L.J. 759 (1971) (for other views on the public trust doctrine).
10. 33 Cal. 3d at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
11. Id. The case presently is pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California, No. Civil S 80-127 LKK.
12. Delta Water Cases, Coordination Proceeding, No. 548, is pending before the San Fran-
cisco Superior Court. South Delta Water Agency, et al. v. United States et al., Civil No. S
82-567 MLS, is pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Califor-
nia. See Amidus Curiae Brief of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California,
No. 83-300, at 6 n.5.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V, in part states: "... nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation." The taking clause of the fifth amendment is made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, which provides: ". . . nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CoN sT. amend. XIV, §1; San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago B.&Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897). The
California Constitution provides: "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use
only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has been paid to, or into
court for, the owner." CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §19.
14. 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
15. See infra notes 149-66 and accompanying text.
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then will focus on the public trust doctrine as a means to avoid the
compensation requirement. 16 Avoidance of the compensation require-
ment will be shown to be premised on the water rights holder having
prior notice of expectations by the public that are incompatible with
his expectations regarding his right to use the water.' 7 This comment
will conclude by arguing that without this prior notice a reduction
of water rights as permitted by the National Audubon Society deci-
sion is a taking 8 requiring compensation. 9 The starting point for this
analysis, and for construction of the Model Scenario, is a brief descrip-
tion of the National Audubon Society controversy and the environs
of the volcanically conceived Mono Lake.
MONo LAKE
Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California,"0 sits at the base
16. See infra notes 167-79 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 180-237 and accompanying text.
18. Whether the reduction of water rights is a taking requiring compensation or an invalid
regulation, in which case compensation is not available as a remedy, is beyond the scope of
this comment. In California, compensation is not available as a remedy. Agins v. City of Tiburon,
24 Cal. 3d 266, 272, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), aff'd on other grounds,
447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980). A California state regulation can be tested through declaratory
relief or mandamus. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. If the regulation is
found to be excessive, it would be invalidated as unconstitutional. See id. Money damages,
however, would not be available for the decrease in the value of the property during the time
the regulation was in force. See id. The Court of Appeals of New York has taken the same
approach ruling that, although a regulation may impose "so onerous a burden" that it effec-
tively deprives all use of the property, that deprivation does not constitute a taking requiring
compensation, but rather "amounts to a deprivation or frustration of property rights without
due process of law and is therefore invalid." Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New
York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8-9, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384-85, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). Several
other states endorse this view. See Bowden & Feldman, Take It or Leave It: Uncertain Regulatory
Taking Standards and Remedies Threaten California's Open Space Planning, 15 U.C. DAvIs
L. REv. 371, 375 n.18 (1981). Late in the nineteenth century the United States Supreme Court
appeared to be propounding this view. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69, (1887);
Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1060 n.18
(1980). In March 1981, however, a four member minority of the present Court indicated that
"the Constitution demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the period
commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking' and ending on the date"
the regulation ceases. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent. Justice Rehnquist would have had "little difficulty in agreeing with much of what
[was] said in the dissenting opinion." Id. at 633. He joined the opinion of the Court, however,
dismissing the case for want of a final judgment. Id. at 636. The United States Supreme Court
does not appear inclined to adopt the California approach. The California approach affects
only the remedy available, not the underlying question of whether the regulation is invalid.
Because of this anomaly in California taking analysis, this comment will refer to a regulation
that is excessive as a taking requiring compensation, with the understanding that, at present,
the California courts would merely invalidate the regulation. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at
28, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
19. See infra notes 239-75 and accompanying text.
20. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 658 P.2d 709, 711,
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of the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range.2" Because the lake has no
outlet,22 it has become saline from eons of evaporation. 23 Nonetheless,
Mono Lake remains a natural feeding and breeding ground for several
species of nesting and migratory birds.2 '
With the surface of the lake above 6000 feet,23 the lake receives
little water from rain and snowfall.26 Most of the water in the lake
comes from snowmelt 27 via the five fresh water streams, Mill, Leevin-
ing, Walker, Parker and Rush Creeks, 28 that rise near the west of
the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range and carry the runoff to the west
shore of the lake. 29 The appropriation of the water from these streams
generated the National Audubon Society controversy.3
Between 1920 and 1934, the City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power purchased the riparian 31 rights incident to the above
creeks32 and the littoral33 rights to Mono Lake itself.3 ' After investiga-
tions and hearings, 35 the Division of Water Resources 36 approved ap-
plications for water rights submitted by the City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (hereinafter referred to as DWP)
in 1934. 31 Permits were granted to appropriate the waters of Walker,
Rush, Parker, and Leevining Creeks.38 The permits required that the
water be used for municipal use and hydroelectric power generation.3 9
In 1941, the necessary works were completed to bring 70,000 acre-
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348 (1983).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 429, 658 P.2d at 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
24. Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
25. Id. at 429, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.




30. See City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 462, 52 P.2d 585, 585-86
(1935); National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
31. Belonging or relating to the'bank of a river or stream; of or on the bank. BLAcK's
LAW DICTONARY 1192 (5th ed. 1979).
32. 33 Cal. 3d at 427 n.4, 658 P.2d at 713 n.4, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 350 n.4.
33. Belonging to the shore, as of seas and great lakes. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 842 (5th
ed. 1979).
34. See 33 Cal. 3d 419, 427, 658 P.2d 709, 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 350.
35. Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California, No.
83-300, at 4 [hereinafter referred to as Petition].
36. The Division of Water Resources was the predecessor agency to the California Water
Resources Board. 33 Cal. 3d at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
37. Petition, supra note 35, at 4.
38. Appendix To Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of California,
No. 83-300, at A-93-A-104 [hereinafter referred to as Appendix].
39. Id. at A-93, A-99.
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feet of the water to Los Angeles each year." In the 1960s a second
set of water works was constructed to divert an additional 30,000
acre-feet per year.4' These additional facilities were put to use in June
1970.2 After inspection by the State Water Resources Control Board,
on May 2, 1973,13 licenses were issued to DWP. These licenses con-
firmed that the Mono Basin appropriative water rights had become
perfected and vested by use in DWP.
The effect of these diversions was both immediate and dramatic. 5
The prediversion area of the lake, 85 square miles, had shrunk to
60.3 square miles. 6 The surface elevation of the lake had dropped
43 feet.47 Islands which had been nesting grounds for California Gulls
became peninsulas. 8 Mountain predators, gaining access over land
bridges, made easy prey of the gull chicks. 49 Negrit Island, once the
most popular nesting site, experienced a sharp decline in the number
of gull nests after coyotes reached the island.5" Outraged at the im-
pending environmental holocaust, National Audubon Society, Friends
of the Earth, the Mono Lake Committee, and the Los Angeles
Audubon Society sued DWP to enjoin the Mono Basin diversions.'
Plaintiffs filed suit in superior court to enjoin the diversions alleging
that the shores, bed, and waters of Mono Lake are protected by the
public trust.52 After removal to federal court,53 the action was stayed,
under the abstention doctrine, 4 to allow the California courts to resolve
state issues. 5 The Alpine County Superior Court entered summary
judgment against the plaintiffs. 56 The California Supreme Court then
took the case on a petition for mandate.57
40. Petition, supra note 35, at 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Appendix, supra note 38, at A-93, A-99.
44. See id. at A-93-A-104.
45. 33 Cal. 3d at 428, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
46. Id. at 429, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
49. Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
50. Id.
51. National Audubon Society v. Department of Water and Power of the City of Los
Angeles, Alpine County Superior Court, No. 566 (1979).
52. NationalAudubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
53. Id. at 431, 658 P.2d at 716-17, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
54. Appendix, supra note 38, at A-59-A-76.
55. 33 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 658 P.2d at 717, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353. Abstention in the federal
court was based on Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959),
and Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 539 (1968). See Appendix, supra note
38, at A-61.
56. Petition, supra note 35, at 8.
57. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
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The California Supreme Court first reviewed the purpose 8 and
scope 9 of the public trust doctrine in California. The court conclud-
ed that the public trust doctrine protects navigable waters from harm
caused by diversions of nonnavigable tributaries."0 Additionally, the
court stated that the statutory permit system used for the allocation
of appropriative rights is not independent of the public trust doctrine.6
Rather, the two are parts of an integrated system of water law. 62 This
integrated system mandates continuing supervision by the state over
the appropriation and use of water.63 Past allocation decisions, which
may be inappropriate given current knowledge or needs, must give
way to this current supervisory obligation, even when those decisions
have given due consideration to their effect on the public trust.
64
The issue confronted is whether the prior notice component of the
public trust doctrine is adequate to circumvent the compensation re-
quirement of the fifth amendment. 6 The next section will construct
a Model Scenario as a device for exploring this elusive area 66 of the
law. Based on the facts and disputes in National Audubon Society,67
the Model Scenario will juxtapose the compensation requirement and
the public trust doctrine.
MODEL SCENARIO
An examination of a set of circumstances that will be used
throughout this comment to measure the public trust doctrine against
the compensation guarantee of the fifth amendment follows. The
Model Scenario consists principally of the facts in National Audubon
Society. 68 A few changes will be made to enhance the analytical
usefulness of this tool.
First, the property holder in the Model Scenario is a private entity.
This eliminates any speculation that the California Supreme Court
could justify the readjustment of property rights without compensa-
58. Id. at 434-35, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
59. Id. at 435-38, 658 P.2d at 719-20, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
60. Id. at 436, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
61. See id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
64. Id.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 18.
66. The United States Supreme Court has stated that it was "unable" to develop any
"set formula" for taking analysis. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
67. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
68. See id.; supra notes 20-64 and accompanying text.
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tion because the rights belong to a nebulous population of several
million69 or because Los Angeles is not entitled to due process
protection."0
The second change in the National Audubon Society facts is one
of procedure. Assumed as a fact in the Model Scenario is that the
California State Water Resources Control Board7 (hereinafter refer-
red to as WRCB) has reconsidered72 the vested water rights of the
water rights holder. This reconsideration resulted in a readjustment
of the water rights to the total exclusion of the water rights holder."
In other words, the WRCB will have determined that the use of the
water consistent with the terms and conditions of the license will in-
flict an intolerable harm on the public trust uses of Mono Lake.
The Model Scenario sets forth one additional procedural change.
In the Model Scenario, the water rights holder has appealed" the deci-
sion of the WRCB to the California Supreme Court. In turn, the
court has upheld the decision of the board asserting that the water
rights holder was not divested of title but retained title subject to
the public trust.75 The question left to be resolved is whether this
exercise of the public trust is a taking requiring compensation.
This Model Scenario is a contrived fact situation but is not
unrealistic. The City of Los Angeles, or many private water rights
holders in California, could be facing this very scenario in the near
69. The population of the City of Los Angeles is estimated to be 2.9 million. THE 1980
CENSUS OF POPULATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, NUMBER OF INHABITANTS-CALIFORNIA 6-22 (1980). The
population of the County of Los Angeles is estimated to be 7.4 million. Id. at 6-11. The popula-
tion of the Los Angeles Standard Consolidated Statistical Area is estimated to be 11.5 million.
Id. at 6-35.
70. See generally, City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923)
(municipalities have no due process protection against acts of the state legislature which has
the power to create and abolish them). Los Angeles has argued that since the state courts
do not have the power to create and abolish municipalities due process protection is available
to Los Angeles who is seeking to sustain a legislative act. Petition, supra note 35, at 26 n.9.
71. Currently, this is the California agency that makes decisions regarding applications
for permits to divert and use water. See CAL. WATER CODE §§179, 1003.5, 1254.
72. See 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
73. A 1979 study recommended that withdrawals from Mono Lake not exceed 15,000 acre-
feet annually. Id. at 429 n.9, 658 P.2d at 714-15 n.9, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351 n.9. That would
require Los Angeles to reduce withdrawals by 85 percent. See Petition, supra note 35, at 4.
The Model Scenario assumes a 100 percent reduction is necessary to protect public trust uses.
This eliminates analytical difficulties regarding the extent of the diminution in value. See generally
4 NICHOLS ON Em, ENr DoMAIN §13.23 (3rd ed. 1981) (regarding valuation of water rights for
taking purposes).
74. See CAL. vATER CODE §1360.
75. The California Supreme Court has suggested this would be the judicial response. See
33 Cal. 3d at 438-40, 658 P.2d at 722-23, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60; supra note 14 and accom-
panying text.
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future.16 Because the Model Scenario is not completely hypothetical,
the question whether readjustment of vested water rights requires com-
pensation is of critical importance. The next section discusses this con-
stitutional issue, focusing on the taking analysis of the fifth
amendment,77 as it pertains to water rights.
TRADITIONAL TAKING ANALYSIS
The constitutional guarantee that private property is not to be taken
without just compensation" was designed to prevent the government
from imposing public burdens on some people alone when, in all
fairness and justice, those burdens should be borne by the public as
a whole.79 The idea that the public should pay for public benefits
is not unique to American jurisprudence. Due process protection of
property rights is rooted in English law.
A. Origins of the Taking Clause
Protection from the expropriation of private property by the
sovereign has its genesis, in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, in the Magna
Carta.8" "No freeman shall be deprived . . . of his freehold . . .
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the
land."" The English nobles' fear that the king would seize" their
land for his own use was subdued by that language." As were the
English nobles, the common law was most concerned with property
rights in land.8" The protection of property rights in American
jurisprudence has not been limited to land.
B. Evolution of Taking Analysis
The prohibition against taking private property without just com-
76. Southern California Edison Company, a private entity, owns water rights in the Mono
Basin including appropriative water rights held under permits and licenses granted by the State
of California. Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the State of California, No. 83-300 at 3 (brief filed by Southern California Edison Company).
77. U.S. CoNsr. amend V.
78. Id.
79. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
80. F. BossEMatr, D. CALis & J. BANTA, TnE TAiN o IssuE 56 (1973).
81. Id. The original Magna Carta contained 63 articles. The quoted portions were extracted
from article 39. By 1225 the charter had been consolidated into 37 articles of which the quoted
matter was number 29. Id.
82. Id. at 319.
83. Id. at 55-60.
84. Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA
GANT L. J. 13, 39 (1976).
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pensation, in large part, has narrowed to an examination of the con-
trolling elements of the fifth amendment.85 These elements are the
concepts of "property" and "taking."" The first of these concepts
to be examined is "property," 87 with an emphasis on its relation to
water rights.
1. Water Rights Defined
0
Two doctrines governing water rights exist: prior appropriation and
riparianism."s Appropriation water law resolves water disputes accord-
ing to the maxim of equity, qui prior est in tempore, potior est injure,"'
first in time is first in right. 90 The rule of priority protects those who
are using the water against others who commence use later.9' Rights
to use water are distributed on a priority basis until the supply is
exhausted. Persons with new demands must purchase rights 92 from
the existing water rights holders. Modernly, appropriative rights are
governed by statutes and state administrative agencies. 91
Riparian rights originated in the common law. 94 Each riparian land-
owner on a stream has a right to make reasonable use of the water.
Upper riparians may not interfere unreasonably with that use. 95
Riparian water law assumes enough water for all if the right to use
the water is restricted to reasonable use by riparian owners. 96 Modernly,
statutes govern water rights even in riparian states. 97
Appropriative and riparian rights inherently are antagonistic, but
several states recognize both. 98 Appropriative and riparian rights are
usufructuary99 in nature and are limited by the doctrine of reasonable
85. See Stoebuck, supra note 18, at 1083.
86. Id.
87. See infra notes 88-126 and accompanying text.
88. F. TRELEASE, WATER LAw 10 (3d ed. 1979).
89. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).
90. He who is before in time is the better in right. Priority in time gives preference in
law. BLACK'S LAw DICTIOARY 1125 (5th ed. 1979). See infra note 216.
91. TREIEASE, supra note 88, at 11.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 10-11.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id. at 12.
98. California, Nebraska, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, and Washington. Only in California and Nebraska may a new use be initiated
by exercising riparian rights. Id. at 11-12.
99. See R. C.AR, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs 349-50 (1967); 1 W. HuTcVns, WATER
RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 441 (1971); C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
RIGHTs 769-73 (2d ed. 1912); 1 H. ROGERS & A. NIcHOLS, WATER FOR CALIFoRNIA 191 (1967);
see also National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
1299
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use. e10 While California has a water rights scheme that contemplates
both appropriative and riparian rights,1"' the Model Scenario encom-
passes only appropriative rights. 0 2 Although appropriative water rights
are usufructuary, they are nonetheless property protected by the fifth
amendment.
2. Water Rights are Property
The term "property" as used in the fifth amendment ... denote[s]
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical
thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it .... The constitu-
tional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may
possess." 1 3 The right to use water is the "sort of interest" that has
received protection.
Early in the history of California water law, the right that an ap-
propriator obtained was held to be private property subject to owner-
ship and disposition by him as with other kinds of private property. 04
California courts have termed appropriative water rights "substan-
tive and valuable property,"'0 5 generally recognizing that they con-
stitute "an interest in realty."'0 6 Appropriative rights are appurte-
nant to the land on or in connection with which the water is used. 07
They pass with the property when deeded without specific mention
of them.'
Modernly, appropriative rights are granted through a state system
361; Seneca Consolidated Gold Mines v. Great Western Power Co., 209 Cal. 206, 215, 287
P. 93, 96 (1930); Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 542-43, 49 P. 577, 578 (1897); Eddy v. Simp-
son, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853).
100. CAL. CONST. art. X, §2, in part provides: "[T]he waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use of water . . . [shall] be prevented, and that the conservation of
such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the
public interest of the people and for the public welfare."
101. 33 Cal. 3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361; People v. Shirokow, 26
Cal. 3d 301, 307, 605 P.2d 859, 864, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34 (1980); W. HtrrcmIs, Tim CA IFoRmA
LAW OF WATER RiGHTS 40, 55-57 (1956); TRELEASE, supra note 88, at 10-12.
102. The argument advanced in this comment would apply to riparian rights also. The analysis
would follow a different path because, unlike appropriative rights, riparian rights are not specific
in character. See TREiLASE, supra note 88, at 10-12.
103. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).
104. Thayer v. California Development Co., 164 Cal. 117, 125, 128 P. 21, 24 (1912); see
Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, 49 (1857); Tartar v. Spring Creek Water & Min. Co., 5 Cal.
395, 399 (1855); 1 HuTcmNs, supra note 99, at 151.
105. McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Min. Co., 13 Cal. 220, 232 (1859).
106. Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 382, 121 P.2d 702, 711 (1942); see Hill v. Newman,
5 Cal. 445, 446 (1855).
107. 3 HurcmNs, supra note 99, at 191.
108. Witherhill v. Brehm, 47 Cal. App. 286, 295, 240 P. 529, 538 (1925).
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of permits' 9 and vested licenses ° for use. After completion of the
structures necessary to divert the water, and upon proof that the water
is being put to reasonable and beneficial use in accordance with the
permit, a California permittee is entitled to a license. This license con-
firms his vested right to divert and use the water."' Licenses, by defini-
tion, are revocable." 2 A California water license may be revoked,
however, only for failure to comply with the conditions stated in the
license" 3 or for failure to put the water to useful or beneficial use.""
As long as these conditions are met, the water right is a private right
subject to ownership" 5 and disposition by the owner, just as other
private property."
6
Unlike other private property, however, a water right is not a general
right to the use of the property. The right to use water is defined
precisely and narrowly1 7 and is granted by the state"' only after public
notice" 9 and deliberation by the WRCB regarding the propriety of
the proposed appropriation. 20 The licenses granted to DWP are
illustrative.' 2
3. Specific Nature of the Property
The WRCB issued to DWP a right to a specific amount of water 22
diverted from four specific tributary creeks 23 at specific points of
109. See CAL. WATER CODE §§102, 1252, 1254-56, 1350, 1380, 1390, 1394, 1410, 1450, 1455,
1611.
110. See id. §§1600, 1610, 1627, 1675.
111. See id. §1610.
112. 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JuLIN & A. Smrm, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 553 n.1
(3d ed. 1979).
113. CAL. WATER CODE §§1611, 1627, 1675.
114. Id. §1240; see County of Amador v. State Board of Equalization, 240 Cal. App.
2d 205, 213, 49 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1966); Mt. Shasta Power Corp. v. McArthur, 109 Cal.
App. 171, 192, 292 P. 549, 558 (1930), aff'd, 9 Cal. 2d 751, 778 (1937). Water unused for
a period of five years reverts to the public and is regarded as unappropriated public water.
CAL. WATER CODE §1241.
115. See CAL. WATER CODE §102.
116. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
117. CAL. WATER CODE §§1253, 1255-57, 1625-29.
118. Id. §§1450, 1455, 1610, 1611.
119. Id. §§1300, 1301, 1310-17, 1320-24, 1330.
120. Id. §§1250, 1251, 1253, 1258, 1350.
121. See Appendix, supra note 38, at A-93-A-104.
122. License No. 10191, amount not to exceed 167,800 acre-feet per calendar year. Id. at
A-94. License No. 10192, amount not to exceed 200 cubic feet per second by direct diversion
and 89,200 acre-feet per annum by storage. Id. at A-100.
123. Leevining Creek, Walker Creek, Parker Creek, and Rush Creek. Id. at A-93, A-94,
A-99, A-100.
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diversion 124 for a specific purpose. 25 The right granted to DWP,
however, was not a general property right to use the water. The water
right owned by DWP is a custom-tailored right to divert a specific
quantity of water for a specifically defined use granted by the state
after deliberation. The narrow definition of modern water rights plays
an important role in determining whether a taking has occurred. 26
The water rights holder in the Model Scenario, therefore, will be
assumed to possess a license to divert a certain quantity of water from
the Mono Basin for one specified use. A precise description of the
water rights that are possessed by the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario is irrelevant to the analysis in this comment, except that the
licensed use must be one that consumes the water outside the Mono
Basin. The history of fifth amendment jurisprudence as applied to
American water law indicates that water rights are property protected
by the taking clause. To determine if the public trust doctrine works
a "taking," the ensuing discussion will examine that term as used
in the fifth amendment.
C. The Concept of "Taking"'27
Most taking cases result from state regulation, therefore, the evolu-
tion of the taking concept commenced with the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment. 8 For this reason a complete concept of a "taking"
was not developed until the first Justice Harlan was on the United
States Supreme Court.'29 Justice Harlan developed two modes of
analyzing the taking clause. Based on a literal reading of the word
"taking," Harlan's first mode of analysis argues that a regulation
is not a "taking" when it involves only limitation upon use by the
owner for purposes declared to be injurious to the community. 3 ' In
124. Id. at A-94-A-95, A-100-A-102.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 117-26, infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
127. See generally, Baumgardner, "Takings" Under the Police Power-The Development of
Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 4 Sw. L.J. 723 (1976);
Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings," 8 HASTINGS CoNsT.
L.Q. 517 (1981); Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 491 (1981); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, The Sovereign's Duty to Compen-
sate for the Appropriation of Public Property, 67 CoLuM. L. REV. 1083 (1967); Note, Just
Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE L.J. 1053 (1966) (for views on the taking
clause other than those cited).
128. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38 (1964) [hereinafter referred
to as Takings].
129. Id.
130. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
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this instance the regulation is a mere exercise of the state police power
subject only to due process limitations. 3 ' Harlan's second mode of
analysis is a corollary of the first. When the regulation imposes a
permanent physical invasion and a "practical ouster"' 2 of the owner's
possession, a "taking" for which compensation is required has
occurred.'33 Nuisance, physical invasion,13  and appropriation of pro-
prietary interest were the touchstones of Justice Harlan's concept of
taking. By the first quarter of the twentieth century, government regula-
tion in the areas of zoning, conservation, and business required
reformulation '35 of the concept of taking. Justice Holmes was the
principal architect of the reformulated taking concept.'36
Justice Holmes relied on a case by case resolution' 37 of what he
perceived to be the core of the fifth amendment conflict: public need
versus private loss. 3 Only when the magnitude of the loss suffered
rendered the affected property "wholly useless"'' 39 would private right
prevail over public need.'4 0 Thus, the prevalent doctrinal application
of the taking concept, the dimunition of value theory,'' looks to the
extent of economic loss as a criterion for determining whether govern-
ment action is a taking requiring compensation.' 42
In a recent pronouncement on the taking doctrine,' 4 3 the United
States Supreme Court refined the Holmes diminution of value theory.
The inquiry focuses on the extent to which the property holders' ability
to earn a reasonable rate of return"'4 on his investment is impaired.
Once the validity of the governmental interest asserted is shown, the
260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Takings, supra note 128, at 38; supra
note 18.
131. 123 U.S. at 668-69.
132. Id. at 668.
133. Id.
134. Takings, supra note 128, at 3840. Physical invasion is still a valid test for whether
or not a regulation is a taking. A recent United States Supreme Court decision held that "when
the character of the government action is a permanent physical invasion of property, our cases
have uniformly found a taking. . . without regard to . . . public benefit or . . . [the] minimal
economic impact" of the regulation. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).




139. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (opinion by Holmes,
J.).
140. Id.
141. Takings, supra note 128, at 151.
142. Id.
143. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
144. Id. at 137; see Note, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HFxAv L. Rav. 57, 230 (1978).
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nature of the interest plays no further role in the taking analysis.'45
To be entitled to compensation, the property right holder must show
that he is precluded from earning a reasonable rate of return on his
investment' 6 or that he has been deprived of distinct investment-backed
expectations' that can be characterized as "primary expectation[s]
concerning the use" '48 of his property.
D. Taking Analysis and Water Rights Adjustment
The primary expectations of the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario are defined specifically in the license granting a vested right
to the use of the water.'4 9 As postulated in the Model Scenario, the
WRCB has determined that further use of the water as licensed must
cease because the use imposes an intolerable burden on the public
trust.' 0 The decision of the WRCB, on first glance, does not appear
to be a taking because it merely seems to place a limitation on the
use of the water in favor of the public trust, leaving available alter-
native uses. Forcing a property rights holder, however, to limit the
use of his property in a manner that harms the public trust is, in
every sense, rendering the property right "wholly useless"'' when
that property right is specifically defined'52 in a way that the only
legal use of the property necessarily harms the public trust.'53
In the Model Scenario, no legal use for the water right exists that
will allow the water rights holder to earn any return on his invest-
ment, much less a reasonable return."' The water rights holder is
deprived completely of any investment-backed expectations 5' and his
primary expectations concerning the use of his property, 6 which are
his only expectations,"" are totally extinguished. Further, the diver-
sion works from Mono Lake to the Owens Valley Aqueduct cannot
be put to any alternative use.'58 This property also is rendered "wholly
145. Note, supra note 144, at 229.
146. Id. at 230.
147. Id.
148. 438 U.S. at 136.
149. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
151. Hudson County Water Co., 209 U.S. at 355; see L. TRIBE, AmmuCAN CONSTiTUTIONAL
LAW 460 (1978).
152. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
153. Unlike National Audubon Society, this is a presumed fact in the Model Scenario. See
supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
155. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-37; Note, supra note 144, at 230.
156. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
157. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
158. See Appendix, supra note 38, at A-93, A-99.
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useless" by the decision of the WRCB. Unlike real property which
when restricted in one use may generate a reasonable rate of return
on the investment in some alternative use,'59 no permissible alternative
uses for the water exist. 6" The property right in the water effectively
is destroyed.
Finally, a strong case could be made that because the decision of
the WRCB physically takes the water from the Owens Valley Aqueduct,
the water right has been invaded physically. Using this reasoning, any
interference that limits the quantity of water to the material injury
of the holder is more than mere regulation; it is a deprivation of
a vested right'61 constituting a taking requiring compensation.
Without the use of the public trust doctrine, the current exposition
of the taking clause'62 would require compensation'63 for a readjust-
ment of the water right in the Model Scenario. 6 The public trust
doctrine 65 avoids the taking issue by claiming a preexisting title' 66
in the property in favor of the state. To understand how the "pre-
existing title" theory circumvents the compensation guarantee of the
fifth amendment, a close examination of the "preexisting title" theory
is necessary.
REASSERTING A PREEXISTING TITLE
Claims of preexisting title are not new to natural resources law.' 67
The techniques for using the preexisting title theory vary from state
to state.'68 The concept has been most prevalent in protecting ocean
159. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137; Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the
Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HAiv. L. Rv. 402, 420 (1977).
160. Use of the water right is specified in the License. See Appendix, supra note 38, at
A-93, A-99.
161. Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 284 N.W. 326, 330 (Neb. 1939).
162. See supra notes 127-61 and accompanying text.
163. The restriction on the use of the property right in Mahon (compensation required)
was less than that authorized by National Audubon Society as postulated in the Model Scenario.
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
164. See supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 9.
166. See BossEniAN, CALuBs & BANTA, supra note 80, at 309-13; see also Morreale, Federal
Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 1, 23-25 (1963) (rejecting the "Notice Theory" of the origin of the federal naviga-
tional servitude).
167. Cf. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (public land); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (reservation of water); United States v. Trinidad Coal Co.,
137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) (land); Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of
Water, 16 RocKy MTN. MiN. L. INsT. 631, 640-41 (1971) (claims by Indians based upon
aboriginal, paramount, and immemorial rights).
168. Bossau.N, CALLmS & BANTA, supra note 80, at 309.
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shores.' 69 A meaningful examination of the "preexisting title" theory
as an exception to the guarantee to compensation must commence
with an understanding of the underlying premise of the exception.
A. Premise of the Exception
The theoretical foundations for the "preexisting title" theory are
nearly syllogistic. According to the theory, the state always has had
a title in the property. 7 ' Property holders should have known 7' the
state had that preexisting title when they acquired their property.
Therefore, when the state acts to reassert title to the detriment of
the property holder, compensation is not required."' Under the pre-
existing title theory, the need for compensation under the fifth amend-
ment is obviated by prior knowledge of the preexisting title. 73 The
reason compensation is not required is that if the property holder
had notice of the preexisting title in the state, the reassertion of the
rights in the title causes neither a change in the law, 1'1 nor a change
in the structural rules under which the property holder was to make
choices regarding expectations in his property rights.' If, however,
announcement by the state that a preexisting title clouded the prop-
erty holder's title is "so certainly unfounded that it may be regarded
as essentially arbitrary"1 76 or as constituting "a sudden change in state
law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents,' '1 77 government
action pursuant to that announcement constitutes a deprivation of
property for which compensation is required. 78 The question whether
169. Id. at 309-10.
170. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 438-39, 440, 658 P.2d at 722, 723, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 359, 360.
171. See TRIBE, supra note 151, at 465; see also Morreale, supra note 166, at 23-25 (regard-
ing the federal navigational servitude).
172. See 33 Cal. 3d at 438-39, 440, 658 P.2d at 722, 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 360.
173. See Michelman, Property, Utility, Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAuv. L. REv. 1165, 1239 (1967); 2 POmEROY, TxrATIsE oN
EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE §591, at 1102 (4th ed. 1918).
174. See Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy, 2 J.
LAw & EcoN. 124, 131-32 (1959).
175. See id.
176. Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917) (the alleged
adequate state ground should not be deffered to).
177. Hughes v. State of Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
178. Cf. id. (ruling that before the Supreme COurt will defer to a determination by a state
that an action is not a taking the Supreme Court must be satisfied that the reasoning of the
state does not constitute "a sudden change in state law"); Demorest v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944) (whether the state determination "rests upon a fair or
substantial basis"); Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 543 (1929) (whether
the state determination so departs from established principles as to be without substantial basis);
Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin, 274 U.S. 651, 656 (1927). (whether
the state determination is a "novel view" inconsistent with earlier state court decisions); Shelter
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compensation is required resolves itself into one of prior notice.7 9
An examination of what the public trust obligates the state to protect
and when a property holder may be said to be on notice will reveal
that the water rights holder in the Model Scenario cannot be charged
with notice sufficient to obviate the compensation guarantee.
B. Prior Notice
The compensation requirement may be dispensed with only if the
property holder had prior notice-actual or constructive-that the state
was obligated to protect public trust uses. Before this concept of prior
notice can be explored fully, an understanding must be reached of
what the public trust obligates the state to protect.
1. Res of the Public Trust
In 1892, the United States Supreme Court decided, in Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad Company v. Illinois,'8 ° that the State of Illinois held
title to the land under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan in trust
for the people of Illinois. 8 ' The Illinois Central decision is the pro-
genitor of the public trust doctrine in American water law."8 2 The
California Supreme Court decided National Audubon Society using
the Illinois Central decision as primary authority'83 to impose limita-
tions on the alienation of trust property.
The genesis of the public trust doctrine can be found in Roman
civil law8 4 and can be traced through the centuries to common-law
traditions in England.'85 The characteristics of the Roman doctrine
are vague. The common-law doctrine is known more precisely. Land
under the navigable waters of England was dedicated to the king,
Framing Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar., 705 F.2d 1502, 1513-16 (9th Cir. 1983) (striking down
the Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. §§1001-461 (1976), amending certain provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, as a violation of due process because the retroactive effects
of the Amendments Act were "so wholly unexpected and disruptive that harsh and oppressive
consequences" would follow if the Act were left in force, 705 F.2d at 1510, quoting, Hazelwood
Chronic & Convalescent Hospitals, Inc. v. Weinberger, 543 F.2d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated
on other grounds, 430 U.S. 952 (1977)).
179. See Michelman, supra note 173, at 1239, 1241.
180. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
181. Id. at 452.
182. See NationalAudubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
183. Id.
184. See Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 185, 185 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Liberating]; Deveney, supra note
84, at 16-36; see also Hannig, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A pro-
posed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA CLAR.A L. Rnv 211, 214 (1983).
185. See Deveney, supra note 84, at 36-52; BOSSELMAN, CALius & BANTA, supra note 80,
at 53-60.
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not for the exclusive use of the sovereign, but for the common use
of all.' 6 From this general principle, the United States Supreme Court
in Illinois Central upheld the revocation of the grant of the Chicago
waterfront to the Illinois Central Railroad Company." 7 In so doing,
the Court held that those lands were inalienable except when aliena-
tion would further the public good."'8 The Court determined that the
Illinois Legislature had not granted a clear title to the railroad.'89 Thus,
Illinois was free to revoke the grant to the Illinois Central Railroad
by exercising rights inherent in that part of the title not deeded. 90
Therefore, no taking requiring compensation had occurred., 9 '
Near the turn of the century the California Supreme Court inter-
preted the public trust doctrine to protect the land covered by the
navigable waters of the state,'92 primarily for the purpose of preserv-
ing and improving navigation and fishing for the public.'93 This was
consistent with the Roman concept of res communis,94 common
properties, 95 and with the Illinois Central case. In 1913, in People
v. California Fish Co., 9 6 the California Supreme Court endorsed the
public trust doctrine as announced in Illinois Central.'91 The public
trust doctrine was held to obligate the state to protect only naviga-
tion, commerce, and fishery. 98 The uses protected by the public trust
remained linked to navigation'99 for several decades. Public trust uses
were held to include the right to use the navigable waters of the state
for hunting,200 fishing, boating,20' and general recreational purposes20 2
including bathing20 3 and incidental use of the bottom land.20 4
186. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 457; Deveney, supra note 84, at 43-50.
187. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 459-60.




192. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 82 (1913).
193. Id.
194. See Deveney, supra note 84, at 16-36; Liberating, supra note 184, at 185. "In the
civil law, things common to all, that is, those things which are used and enjoyed by everyone,
even in single parts, but can never be exclusively acquired as a whole, e.g., light and air."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979).
195. JUsTrNAN INstITUTes, 2.1.1-2.1.6, cited in, Liberating, supra note 184, at 185 n.l.
196. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913).
197. Id. at 584, 138 P. at 82.
198. Id.
199. See City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482, 476 P.2d 423, 441, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 23, 42 (1970).
200. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 40, 127 P. 156, 162-63 (1912).
201. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 749, 238 P.2d 128, 136 (1951).
202. See id. at 749, 238 P.2d at 136, quoting, Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation
Comm'n, 38 N.W.2d 712, 715, 716 (Wis. 1949).
203. 107 Cal. App. 2d at 749, 238 P.2d at 136.
204. See id.; see also People v. Mack, 19 Cal App. 3d 1040, 1044-49, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448,
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In 1971, in Marks v. Whitney,2"5 the California Supreme Court an-
nounced a fundamental change in the frame of reference used for
identifying the uses of water that the public trust doctrine obligates
the state to protect. The court held that the objectives of the public
trust were no longer static, fixed, known quantities linked to naviga-
tion. Rather, the uses that the state must protect are defined by the
ebb and flow of "changing public needs."2 6 Marks v. Whitney decreed
that the changing public perception of values and uses of waterways" 7
obligated the state to preserve tide lands in their natural state to serve
as "ecological units for scientific study'"20° and for the environmen-
tal amenities20 9 that have become valued in the past twenty years. 21 °
Since the Marks v. Whitney decision, the California Supreme Court
has used the public trust doctrine to protect the shores of San Fran-
cisco Bay from land fill development21 ' and to settle uncertainty re-
garding title to land between the low and high water mark along the
shoreline of navigable nontidal waters.212
450-53 (1971) (defining the pleasure boat test for navigation used in California).
205. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
206. Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. In changing the scope of the res
of the public trust the court stated that ". . . in administering the trust the state is not bur-
dened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another." Id.,
citing, Colberg, Inc. v. The State of California, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 421-22, 432 P.2d 3, 12, 62
Cal. Rptr. 401, 410 (1967). The Colberg case, however, did not redefine the res of the trust.
Colberg merely recognized that the character of "commerce" changes over time. 67 Cal. 2d
at 421-22, 432 P.2d at 12, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 410. Colberg did not add to "the traditional triad
of uses-navigation, commerce and fishing." National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 434,
658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
207. 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
208. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
209. Id. at 260, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
210. All the environmental values that have received the attention of the public in the past
generation cannot be listed. The values attached to and the uses for water are dynamic and
change with the subjective perception of the public of the golden mean between a pristine
"natural" environment and material needs that must be provisioned. See Walston, The Public
Trust in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 63, 87 (1982). As a result, the California constitutional requirement of reasonableness
varies and cannot be measured at any fixed point in time. See CAL. CONST. art. X, §2; CAL.
WATER CODE §100; supra note 100; Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 67 Cal. 2d
132, 140, 429 P.2d 889, 894, 60 Cal. Rptr. 337, 382 (1967); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2
Cal. 2d 351, 367, 40 P.2d 486, 491 (1934); Natoma Water & Min. Co. v. Hancock, 101 Cal.
42, 52, 35 P. 334, 337 (1894).
211. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 534-35, 606 P.2d 362, 373-74,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 338-39 (1980).
212. State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 230-31, 625 P.2d 239, 251-52, 172
Cal. Rptr. 696, 708-09 (1981); State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 29 Cal. 3d 240, 243, 625
P.2d 256, 257, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 714 (1981); accord City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula
Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 291, 644 P.2d 792, 793-94, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599, 600-01 (1982),
rev'd, Summa Corp. v. California ex rel State Lands Commission, 104 S.Ct. 1751, 1755-58
(1984) (holding California cannot assert its public trust easement over property granted
to private parties in confirmation proceedings pursuant to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago,
9 Stat. 922).
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Imposing this amorphous concept of the "changing public needs"
on water rights will have an unknown impact on the certainty
essential" 3 to the beneficial use of water. What is known is that water
rights granted after 1971214 are limited by this new public trust obliga-
tion of the state to protect the changing needs, values, and uses of
the waterways not encumbered by the notions of navigation, com-
merce, and fishing. Contrary to the assertion of the California Supreme
Court, until 1971 the scope of the preexisting title in the state was
limited to protecting the interest of the public in navigation, com-
merce, and fishing.215 The grant to the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario, with a priority216 date before 1971,217 was not burdened with
this expanded obligation in the state to protect the changing needs,
values, and uses of waterways unencumbered by the three traditional
classifications. Rather, the grant to the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario was burdened by a public trust that gave the state the power
to act within the trust " . . . purposes of commerce, navigation and
fisheries for the benefit of all the people of the state."2 The state
may expand the scope of the rights it will retain on granting property
rights.219 Applying the expanded definition of the public trust retro-
actively in derogation of exercised property rights, however, is a tak-
ing requiring compensation.22 0 For the state to apply this new defini-
213. California Water Code section 109 in part provides: "The Legislature hereby finds
and declares that the growing water needs of the state require the use of water in an efficient
manner and that the efficient use of water requires certainty in the definition of property rights
to the use of water . . ." See Arizona v. California, 103 S. Ct. 1382, 1392 (1983); People
v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 310, 605 P.2d 859, 865-66, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 36 (1980); In
re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 355-57, 599 P.2d 656, 666,
158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 360 (1979); TREEASE, supra note 88, at 11; Walston, Supra note 210, at 91.
214. After Marks, a new water rights holder could be charged with prior notice that the
judicial policy of the California courts was to give claims diffusely held by the public equal
consideration in the resolution of disputes regarding use of common resources. See 6 Cal. 3d
at 260, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 162 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Public Rights].
215. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452, 457; Colberg, 67 Cal. 2d at 417, 432 P.2d at
9, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 407; California Fish, 166 Cal. at 584, 138 P.2d at 182. The California
Supreme Court asserted that the res of the trust has not been limited by the traditional uses
of navigation, commerce, and fishing. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d
at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356. This assertion is at odds with the cases leading to Marks v.
Whitney. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text and note 206.
216. "Priority of an appropriative right is the superiority of the right over all rights of
later priority when the available water supply is not enough for all." 1 HUTCHINs, supra note
99, at 226 (emphasis in original). An application for a permit to appropriate water, properly
made, gives the applicant a priority of right as of the date of the application. CAL. WATER
CODE §§1450, 1455.
217. The priority of right of the licenses of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
is July 27, 1934. Appendix, supra note 38, at A-93, A-99.
218. Colberg, 67 Cal. 2d at 417, 432 P.2d at 9, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
219. See In re Yun Quong, 159 Cal. 508, 512, 114 P. 835, 837 (1911).
220. See supra notes 127-79 and accompanying text.
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tion of the public trust obligation retroactively in derogation of pro-
perty rights that are the basis of substantial investment-backed ex-
pectations and avoid the compensation requirement, the property rights
holder must have had prior notice of possible collective action.22 ' An
examination of the history of the water rights in the Model Scenario
is instructive in determining if the water rights holder had received
this prior notice.
2. Notice of Possible Collective Action
For the water rights holder in the Model Scenario, three dates are
relevant. First, the water rights holder could be said to have been
on notice in 1934, the priority date of his water right.222 Second, notice
could be charged to the water rights holder in the 1930s and early
1940s when substantial capital was invested223 by the water rights holder
in reliance on his primary expectations concerning the use of the water.
These positions, however, suffer from anachronistic reasoning. The
significant environmental impact that would be caused by the diver-
sions was known in 1934.224 The existing public perception of the values
and uses of the waterways, however, was fundamentally different then,
from what it is today.225 Had the environmental impact been con-
sidered fully in the 1934 permit hearing,22 6 undoubtedly the permits
would have been approved.227 Today society recognizes diffusely held
claims asserted by the public at large, in maintenance of aesthetic
and environmental amenities, as public rights.228 In 1934, however,
diffusely held claims were not recognized as public rights entitled to
equal consideration in the resolution of conflicting claims to a com-
mon resource base. 229 Specific rights had to be threatened before legal
significance would be given to a claim. 230 At the time the permits
221. See Michelman, supra note 173, at 1239.
222. See supra note 217.
223. See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
224. See City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 464-65, 52 P.2d 585, 587
(1935); National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 427-28, 658 P.2d at 713-714, 189 Cal. Rptr.
350-51.
225. In the past public values limited the public interest to economic concerns. Robie, The
Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. IN sT. 917, 933 (1977).
226. The California Supreme Court stated: "No responsible body has ever determined the
impact of diverting the entire flow of the Mono Lake tributaries into the Los Angeles Aqueduct."
33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
227. Environmental and aesthetic values were not given the importance in 1934 that they
are today. See Robie, supra note 225, at 933, quoting, NATIONAL WATER COaN SSiON, NEw
DIRECTIoNs IN U.S. WATER POLICY 5 (1973).
228. See Public Rights, supra note 214, at 159.
229. Id.
230. Cf. 33 Cal. 3d at 428 n.7, 658 P.2d at 714 n.7, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351 n.7 (that recrea-
tional opportunities would be diminished was not grounds to deny a permit in 1934).
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for appropriation were approved, the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario could have been charged with notice only by foreseeing the
emergence of public values incompatible with his primary
expectations."' This reasoning, however, is "fantastic when the con-
clusion depending from that premise is that we may now destroy [the
water rights holder's] investment without compensating him." '232 Aside
from the demoralizing effect on economic activity this reasoning would
cause,233 the analysis implicitly assumes the water rights holder would
invest nearly $200 million,"' knowing in the future his investment
would be rendered wholly useless without any form of compensation.3
This assumption directly challenges the requirement that a property
holder is entitled to a reasonable rate of return on his investment 236
and flies in the face of rational investment judgment. The assump-
tion that the water rights holder would invest heavily in rights know-
ing they were going to be rendered valueless in a few years fails for
lack of foundation, as do both of the responses to the prior notice
question.
The third response to the prior notice question is, in reality, a
method for determining how a water rights holder would be charged
with notice. This response asserts that the water rights holder is not
entitled to compensation if his expectations concerning the use of his
property are inconsistent with public values that changed over time
in a manner that gave notice to the water rights holder of the grow-
ing incompatability. 211 Changing public values that manifest themselves
in a manner that provides notice serves two purposes. First, they define
the obligation of the state to reassert its preexisting title. Second, they
give notice to the water rights holder that his water right is subject
to the expanded definition of the preexisting title of the state. Deter-
mining when a water rights holder is on notice, then, is viewed more
clearly as an inquiry into the manner in which the changing public
values can manifest themselves in a way that gives notice to the water
rights holder of the expanded definition of the preexisting title in the
state.
231. Cf. Michelman, supra note 173, at 1237 (similar analysis regarding the brickworks
case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1237 n.122.
234. Petition, supra note 35, at 3-4.
235. See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137 (suggesting that some alternative to com-
pensation at the highest and best value of the property may circumvent the taking question).
236. Id. at 136; TRiNE, supra note 151, at 465.
237. See Michelman, supra note 173, at 1239-42.
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3. Public Values Changing in a Manner to Give Notice
Knowing precisely the limits within which a water rights holder may
generate protectible investment-backed expectations is difficult because
the res of the public trust obligation is of an amorphous character. 38
The water rights holder must rely on some legally significant event
that can be the basis for both his notice of preexisting title in the
state and for defining the extent of the title of the state in his water
right. Changing public values might manifest themselves in two ways
and still generate a legally significant event upon which the water rights
holder can rely: legislative recognition, and judicial recognition. In
the environmental context, both legislative and judicial recognition
came about through public demonstration. Public demonstration,
however, is not a sufficient means of generating a legally significant
event upon which notice can be based.
a. Public Demonstration
Environmental rallies or other forms of public demonstration are
not sufficient to give a water rights holder notice of preexisting title
in the state.239 The water rights holder has no way of knowing whether
the demonstrators represent a radical minority faction or a coalesc-
ing majority which, in time, will be of sufficient magnitude to im-
pose an obligation on the state to protect the values for which they
are demonstrating. Further, demonstrations by the public expressing
generalized concern for an environmental issue do not provide the
water rights holder with any insight into the public trust obligation
of the state. Some particular issues may become focused through public
demonstration. Public demonstrations, however, cannot generate ob-
jective standards by which the water rights holder could measure his
conduct because environmental issues deal with changing public values
and the delicate balance of nature. In a democracy, changing public
values that are sufficient to receive legal protection are recognized
in two ways: statutes are enacted to protect those values, and judicial
doctrine gives legal significance to those values.
238. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
239. Cf. PoMEROY, supra note 173, §597.
A... person obtaining any right in specific property, is not affected by vague rumors,
hearsay statements, and the like, concerning prior conflicting claims upon the same
property; and the reason is, that such kind of reports and statements do not furnish
him with any positive information, any tangible clew, by the aid of which he may
commence and successfully prosecute and inquiry, and thus discover the real truth;
Id. at 1118-19.
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b. Legislative Recognition
In 1928, the California Legislature enacted, and the voters approved,
a constitutional provision240 that was designed to govern and protect
the water resources of the state. That provision recognizes that the
right to divert and use water for reasonable and beneficial use is in-
herent in the California scheme of water rights.2 ' Recognition of the
water rights policy in the California Constitution is reflected in several
provisions of the California Water Code.24 2 The Legislature specifically
has provided that the right to the use of water may be acquired 243
through a system of permits 244 and licenses. 2 5 Once an appropriator
was granted a license, it would be effective for as long as the water
actually was diverted and used in conformity with the specific condi-
tions of the license.2"6 By 1943, public values had coalesced into a
sufficient force to cause the Legislature to mandate that the "public
interest" be taken into account in the allocation of water resources.247
The Legislature, however, did not determine that considerations of
"public interest" were sufficient to divest long relied on water rights. 248
That question was left to the judiciary.
c. Judicial Recognition
As noted above, in 1971 the California Supreme Court determined
that the public trust obligates the state to protect changing public
values in the use of water resources.24 9 Not until 1983, in National
Audubon Society, however, did the California Supreme Court decide
that these shifting public values were of sufficient magnitude that they
should be given legal significance. The court recognized these public
values as a means by which to destroy water rights that had been
the basis of distinct investment-backed expectations.
240. CAL. CONST. art. X, §2 (enacted as art. XIV, §3).
241. [T]he right to water or to use the flow of water in or from any natural stream
or water course of this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water.
Id.
242. See CAL. WATER CODE §§106.5, 1201, 1240, 1241, 1243, 1257, 1429, 1600, 1627, 1675.
243. "[The right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation . .. . " Id. §102.
244. Id. §§1252, 1350, 1380, 1390, 1394, 1455, 1600.
245. Id. §§1455, 1600, 1610, 1627, 1675.
246. Id. §1627.
247. Id. §§1253, 1255-57.
248. See id. §§1253, 1255-1257.
249. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
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In Marks v. Whitney"' the California Supreme Court determined
that the tidelands in dispute were subject to the trust. 25 1 Neither Marks
nor Whitney, however, had made substantial investment 252 in reliance
on use of the disputed tidelands. Additionally, both parties were left
with a residuum of land not subject to the public trust253 from which
they could earn a reasonable rate of return.254 Distinct investment-
backed expectations were not destroyed. Other decisions by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court also fail to give notice to the water rights holder
that "it had become clear" '255 that his diversions were so incompati-
ble with "the changing public perception of the values and uses of
waterways"256 that they could be destroyed 251 without compensation.
In City of Berkeley v. Superior Court2 58 the California Supreme
Court held that notwithstanding the rule of property doctrine, 2 9 vir-
tually all tidelands along the Pacific Ocean in California were subject
to the public trust.260 Significantly though, the court held that
"[p]roperties that have been filled, whether or not they have been
substantially improved, are free of the trust to the extent the areas
of such parcels are not subject to tidal action." ' 26' Substantially all
investment-backed expectations were left intact.
In State v. Superior Court (Lyon)262 and State v. Superior Court
(Fogerty)263 the California Supreme Court held that owners of pro-
250. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
251. Id. at 259, 491, P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
252. Other than Whitney's pier which extends into Tomales Bay, and necessitated an ease-
ment over Mark's parcel, neither party had made any improvements that were subordinated
to the public trust. See id. at 266, 491 P.2d at 384, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 800 (map).
253. Id.
254. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-37.
255. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
256. Id. at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
257. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
258. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
259. [D]ecisions long acquiesced in, which constitute rules of property of trade or upon
which important rights are based, should not be disturbed, even though a different
conclusion might have been reached if the question presented were an open one,
inasmuch as uniformity and certainty in rules of property are often more important
and desirable than technical correctness. Thus, judicial decisions affecting the business
interests of the country should not be disturbed except for the most cogent reasons,
as where the evils of the principle laid down will be more injurious to the community
than can possibly result from a change, or upon the clearest grounds of error.
Id. at 552, 606 P.2d at 372, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 337, quoting, Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,
50 Cal. 2d 438, 456-57, 326 P.2d 484, 494-95 (1958).
260. City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 535-36, 606 P.2d at 626, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39;
accord Venice Peninsula, 31 Cal. 3d at 302-03, 644 P.2d at 801, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 608, rev'd,
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel State Lands Commissioner, 104 S.Ct. 1751, 1753 (1984).
261. City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 534, 606 P.2d at 626, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
262. 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
263. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 626 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981).
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perty littoral to Clear Lake and Lake Tahoe, respectively, hold title
to their property subject to the public trust.2"' The court, however,
specifically allowed land owners who had previously constructed docks,
piers, and other structures in the shore zone to continue to use these
facilities,2 65 subject to the shifting values of the public trust. 26 6 If the
state decides that the continued existence of these previously constructed
docks, piers, and other structures is inconsistent with the obligations
imposed by the public trust, the state must compensate the landowners
for improvements they have constructed in the shore zone.267 Com-
pensation was required for the exercise of the public trust.
National Audubon Society is unique in both California and
American jurisprudence. National Audubon Society is the first case
to hold that the public trust doctrine imposes on the state an obliga-
tion to protect water,2 68 not land, to whatever extent is necessary to
protect the changing public perception of the values and uses of
waterways.269
Cases holding that tidelands, which have been filled by riparian
owners, are freed of the trust,27 and cases holding that the razing
of improvements on littoral land subject to the trust requires
compensation27' do not express judicial recognition of changing values
in a manner that gives notice27 to the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario. Not until 1971 in Marks v. Whitney did the California
Supreme Court rule that the changing public perceptions of the values
and uses of the waterways define the parameters of the public trust
obligation of the state. Another twelve years passed before the Na-
tional Audubon Society decision notified water rights holders that the
changing public values generated a legally cognizable obligation in
the state to divest water rights without compensation when those water
rights conflict with changed public needs. Both the Marks v. Whitney
264. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 323, 625 P.2d at 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708; see Fogerty, 29
Cal. 3d at 244, 625 P.2d at 257, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 714 (holding the primary issues are the
same as in Lyon).
265. 29 Cal. 3d at 250, 265 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
266. See id.
267. Id.
268. Other cases state that the public trust doctrine protects water. Each of these cases,
however, rests upon the constitution of the respective state. See North Dakota State Water
Comm'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254, 258 (N.D. 1983); Wisconsin's Environmental
Decade, Inc. v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (Wis. 1978); United Plainsmen
Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n., 247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976).
269. NationalAudubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
270. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 534-35, 606 P.2d 362, 373, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, 338 (1980).
271. Fogerty, 29 Cal. 2d at 249, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
272. See Michelman, supra note 173, at 1239.
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and the National Audubon Society modifications of the public trust
doctrine are significant legally in defining the permissible scope of
the distinct investment-backed expectations of the water rights holder.
The first of these modifications, however, came a decade after the
water rights holder had made his most recent investment in reliance
on the only expectations permissible under his license. 73 Notice after
the fact does not obviate the need to compensate'7 the water rights
holder in the Model Scenario.
CONCLUSION
Mono Lake is a scenic beauty that should be preserved for the public
benefit. Continued diversions of 100,000 acre-feet per year2 7 1 will alter
the environs of the lake radically.2 76 The California Supreme Court,
acting to protect the changed public values regarding Mono Lake,
held that the state, by reasserting a "preexisting" title, could divest
water rights to protect the public trust. 77 Because the state was merely
reasserting a preexisting title, the state was not engaging in a taking
for which compensation is required. An analysis of the preexisting
title rationale, however, has revealed that in 1934, when the water
rights holder in the Model Scenario obtained his water rights, the
part of the title retained by the state under the public trust was limited
to the interests of the public in navigation, commerce, and fishing.
78
This definition of the title retained by the state was expanded radically
in 1971, in the case of Marks v. Whitney. 79
The California Supreme Court, in Marks v. Whitney, defined the
public trust as an obligation in the state to protect the changing public
needs, values, and uses of the waterways unencumbered by the tradi-
tional classifications."' The part of the title retained by the state in
the water rights granted to the water rights holder in the Model
Scenario did not give the state power to prohibit, at some time in
the future, uses of the water rights that were vested and which were
inconsistent with the expanded definition as announced in Marks v.
Whitney.
2 81
273. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
274. See Michelman, supra note 173, at 1239; supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
275. See Petition, supra note 35, at 4.
276. See National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 429-31, 658 P.2d at 716-17, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 352-53.
277. See id. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
280. See id.
281. See supra notes 184-204 and accompanying text.
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The state may apply the expanded definition of the public trust
to water rights created before the Marks v. Whitney decision and avoid
the compensation requirement in two circumstances. If the public trust
historically had been so expansively defined, then assertion of rights
by the state consistent only with the expanded definition would be
no change in the law282 and, therefore, not a taking requiring
compensation.28 3 An examination of the public trust doctrine revealed
that historically the res of the public trust had been defined as uses
relating to navigation, commerce, and fishing.28 A second way the
state may retroactively apply the expanded definition of the public
trust and avoid the compensation requirement was explored. 285 If, prior
to a water rights holder having invested substantial capital in reliance
on his water rights, he could be charged with notice that the expanded
definition of the public trust would be applied to his water rights,
then state actions consistent with only the expanded definition would
not be a taking requiring compensation. 86 Water rights holders,
however, could not be charged with notice of the expanded defini-
tion until 1971.287 Not until 1983 could a water rights holder be charged
with notice that the public trust imposed on the state a continuing
obligation to reconsider water rights vested in the owners and relied
upon by those owners as the basis for distinct investment-backed
expectations. 88 Defining the constitutional requirement to compen-
sate in terms of the "changing public needs" is not only unwise
policy 289 for the water rights holder in the Model Scenario, this defini-
tion does not provide notice of the destructive public trust obligation
until years after his most recent investments made in reliance on his
expectations concerning the use of his water rights.2 9 The water rights
in the Model Scenario are defined very precisely. 91 Therefore, pro-
hibiting uses inconsistent with the public trust, in effect, prohibits
any use of the water rights and constitutes a taking2 92 requiring
282. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 127-78 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 170-79, 231-37 and accompanying text.
286. See id.
287. See supra notes 205-19 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 240-74 and accompanying text.
289. "MIhe mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social
judgments undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one genera-
tion to the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpetation." Regents of the Univ. of the
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978), citing, Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U.S. 429, 650-51 (1895) (White, J., dissenting).
290. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 18.
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compensation. 29 3 The preexisting title theory of the public trust doc-
trine asserts retroactively that the water rights holder never possessed
the property, therefore, compensation is not required when the state
acts to protect public trust uses that conflict with the water rights. 9
This contravenes the mandate of the fifth amendment.
[A] state cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibi-
tion against taking property by the simple device of asserting retro-




293. See supra notes 149-64, 267-73 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
295. Hughes v. State of Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
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